基于声誉理论的研发外包动态激励机制研究

Study on Dynamic Incentive Mechanism of R&D Outsourcing Based on Reputation Theory

基于声誉理论,本文建立了企业研发外包的动态激励机制模型,研究了承包方在同一个契约里长期激励与短期激励相结合的激励模式,得出了实现声誉有效激励的条件和提高声誉激励效应的途径。研究结果表明:考虑声誉机制时,承包方在第1期、第2期的努力水平比不考虑声誉机制时提高了,承包方从第1期、第2期产出里分享的剩余份额比不考虑声誉机制时提高了。因此,与没有引入声誉机制的契约模型相比,声誉激励机制和显性激励机制相结合的最优动态契约模型可以实现帕累托改进、提高激励强度,并能起到很好的约束作用。

Based on the reputation theory, this paper establishes a model of optimal dynamic incentive mechanism, and studies the incentive mode which combines the long-term incentive with the short-term incentive in one contract,and points out the conditions of achieving effective reputation incentive and the ways to enhance incentive effects. Results show that：when considering the reputation mechanism, the agent＇s effort and income are both improved in the first and second period;compared with a model of explict incentive contract without the reputation mechanism, the model of optimal dynamic incentive contract, in which the reputation mechanism and the explicit incentive mechanism are combined, can achieve Pareto improvement and increase incentive intensity and play a good restriction.