康德论证自由的“知识论进路”——兼论康德文本中关于范畴的起源问题

Kant's Cognitive Approach to the Concept of Freedom:On the Origin of Categories in Critique of Pure Reason

康德哲学的一个核心工作是论证自由,这一工作有两个相互衔接的路径:一个是在《纯粹理性批判》里进行的论证路径,我们称为"知识论进路";一个是在《实践理性批判》里进行的论证路径,我们称为"伦理学进路"。在《纯粹理性批判》里,通过澄清范畴的起源(Ur-sprung)与权限(Befugnis)问题,一方面确立了范畴的先验性(a prioritaet),从而完成为一切知识奠定先验性基础的工作,另一面也确定了范畴的客观界限,从而限定了以这些范畴为基础的一切知识的客观界限。而知识界限的限定,在根本上意味着把"人"从知识主体与感性身份中解放出来,维护与捍卫了人的另一个更重要的身份,那就是作为自在存在者(das Wesen an sich selb-st)的"自由者"身份。

One of the focuses of the Kantian philosophy is freedom. In order to fulfil the task, Kant opened up two interlinked approaches： one is ＂the cogitive approach＂ carried out in Critique of Pure Reason, the other is ＂the ethical approach＂ in Critique of Practical Reason. In the first Critique, Kant clarified the origin and capacity of categories, by which he establishes a priori categories, and further secures a priori grounds for all cognition. Meanwhile, Kant also established the objective limitations of categories and therefore those of knowledge based on the categories. Fundamentally, the delimitation of knowledge means emancipating ＂human being＂ from cognitive subject and perceptual identity, thus securing and maintaining another more significant identity of human beings, i.e., the ＂free being＂ who is being-it-itself.