乳品供应链质量安全控制的博弈分析

A Game Analysis of the Quality and Safety Control in the Dairy Supply Chain

分析了乳品供应链各环节的质量安全隐患,建立了由奶农、奶站、乳品生产企业、销售企业和消费者组成的供应链质量安全静态博弈模型。通过求解得到乳品供应链上各主体的最优混合策略,即只有上游企业正当经营,下游企业积极承担检查责任,各主体才能获得最大利润,只有管理者实施重点监管,各主体相互协作,乳品供应链才能获得最大收益。通过算例进一步揭示了上游向下游传递风险的经济原因和下游对上游实施监控的必然规律。

This paper analyzes the problems from the quality and safety in the various segments of the dairy supply chain, establishing a static game model on quality and safety in the supply chain, which is made up of the dairy farmers, the milk stations, the dairy production enterprise, the sale enterprise and consumers. By the model, it figures out the optimal mixed strategy of the stakeholders in the supply chain. The strategy proves that only the up- stream legally manages the company and the downstream actively takes on responsibility, the stakeholders can make the maximal profits; only the managers carry on the major supervision and the stakeholders cooperate recipro- cally, the dairy supply chain can get the maximum benefits. The case further reveals the economic reason on the risk transferred from the upstream to the downstream and the inevitable rule that the downstream should monitor the upstream.