摘要
少数大客户一直因其较强的抗风险能力而得到银行的青睐,特别是对规模较小的城市商业银行,贷款向这类客户集中成为普遍现象。然而本文的实证结果表明城市商业银行的客户贷款集中不但增大了银行的风险,而且还侵蚀了利润。贷款集中行为短期看似乎因大客户较强的抗风险能力而使贷款的安全性得到保障,但实际上最终会导致银行陷入风险和收益被一家或少数几家客户"套牢"的被动地位,加剧了城市商业银行的脆弱性。
Some few key customers are often the favorite of banks because of their powerful antirisk ability. So it is popular for small urban commercial banks to concentrate their loans on this type of customers. However, the empirical results of the paper show that the loan concentration not only increases bankss risks, but also erodes their profit. In the short run it would appear to be safety for banks to lend one or ten customers having strong ability to resist risks. But in fact banks will be put in passive status by the behavior because both their risks and earnings are trapped by the few accounts, which aggravate the fragility of urban commercial banks.
出处
《金融理论与实践》
北大核心
2009年第11期71-74,共4页
Financial Theory and Practice
关键词
风险
收益
客户
贷款集中
Risks
Earnings
Customers
Loan Concentration