评审的经济学分析

Economic Analysis of Evaluation

改革以来,审批逐渐减少,评审却在持续增加,并已成为某些领域中重要的资源配置机制。评审优于审批,但评审组织者仍可在评审中体现自己的意志。评审组织者对评审的操纵程度越高,评审机制越接近计划经济中的审批。这种操纵在评审规则制定和评审过程中均有体现。评审同时也是一种激励机制,对评审对象具有重要导向作用,并有可能引起评审对象的行为偏差。评审组织者偏离社会利益目标的操纵和评审对象为通过评审所做努力中的偏差,会使资源配置偏离社会福利最大化的目标。因而,应控制通过评审分配资源的比例,尽可能地使评审规则科学化,并保持规则的相对稳定性,规范评审过程,增加评审的公开性,加强评审后资源使用情况的公开监督。

With the decrease of approval, evaluation increases, becoming an important resource allocating mechanism in certain fields. Evaluation is superior to approval, but people who evaluate can still realize their will in the process of evaluation. The higher the extent to which the organizer of evaluation can manipulate the evaluation, the closer the evaluating mechanism is to approval in the planned economy. This kind of manipulation is observed in the setup of evaluating rules as well as the process of evaluation. Evaluation is also an incentive mechanism, which is a very important guidance to people who will be evaluated and may cause their behaviors diverged. The manipulation of evaluating organizers which diverge from social benefit as well as the effort people make in order to pass the evaluation will make resource allocation diverge from maximization of social welfare. Therefore, the proportion of allocating resource through evaluation should be controlled, and rules should be made scientifically and should be kept relatively constant. In addition, the evaluation process should be modified, the openness of evaluation should be increased, and the supervision of the resource usage after evaluation should be enhanced.