WTO反倾销体制的无效性原因分析

Analysis on Invalidity Causes of WTO Anti-dumping System

反倾销方面的研究文献众多,但现有反倾销研究热衷于探讨为何反倾销措施大量增加方面的问题,而对价格承诺为何较少使用、反倾销体制为何不能有效阻止倾销等问题研究较少。文章把传统的倾销模型拓展到一个倾销商和进口国政府的动态博弈模型中进行分析,发现:在任何情况下倾销都是垄断出口厂商的占优策略;征收反倾销税比起自由贸易更有利于进口国福利。这对倾销现象有增无减、价格承诺比重很少、反倾销措施数量居高不下的现状提供了一个有益的理论解释,同时也揭示了现行反倾销措施对于遏制倾销的无效性。文章认为,相对于反倾销,反进口垄断更能够改善现行世贸组织体制的效率,并增进进口国福利。

Most literatures in antidumping focus on the reason leading to increasing antidumping measures, and pay little attention to the causations of continued dumping. At the same time, PU （Price Undertaking） as an antidumping remedy measure is rarely reached in antidumping practice, which is also neglected by existing studies. This paper extends the mainstream dumping model into a dynamic game between the monopoly dumping enterprise and the government of imported country, and reaches a significant conclusion that PU is dominated by continuous dumping for dumping enterprise and antidumping duty will improve the welfare of imported country.