相互持股的契约理论分析

下载PDF

导出

摘要企业间相互持股制度能通过以企业契约代替市场契约,以长期合同代替短期合同,以不完备合同代替完备合同,以企业集团内部的相互协调代替市场竞争等机制,导致交易成本的下降。

作者陈其末

机构地区湖北第二师范学院数学与数量经济学院

出处《湖北第二师范学院学报》 2009年第10期78-79,共2页 Journal of Hubei University of Education

关键词相互持股契约理论交易成本

参考文献7

1奥村宏.日本六大企业集团[M].沈阳:辽宁人民出版社,1981.
2Hiroshi Osano. Intereorporate Shareholdings and Corporate Control in the Japanese Firm. Journal of Banking & Finance, 1996, (20) : 1047 - 1068.
3James S. Ang . Richard Constand. The Portfolio Behavior of Japanese Corporations' Stable Shareholders. Journal of Multinational Financial Management ,2002.12.
4Kuroki, F. The Present Status of Unwinding of Cross - shareholding: The Fiscal 2000 survey of Cross - shareholding . NLI Research Paper No. 157, NLI Research Institute,2001.
5Leibenstein. Harvey. Entreprcneurship. Entrepreneurial Training. and X - efficiency Theory. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1987,8 (2) : 191 - 205.
6Steven N. S. Cheung. The Contractual Nature of the Firm. Journal of Law and Economics, April 1983.
7Weinstein. David E. and Yafeh. Yishay. On the Costs of a Bank - Centered Financial System : Evidence from the Changing Main Bank Relations in Japan. Journal of Finance, 1998,53 (2) : 635 - 672.

湖北第二师范学院学报

2009年第10期

内容加载中请稍等...