零售商合谋模式下的渠道定价策略

Channel pricing strategy under the mode of retailer collusion

零售商合谋是零售商为提高利润水平而普遍采用的市场手段,它会对渠道价格决策行为产生影响。针对多个制造商和多个零售商组成的常规渠道结构,本文探讨了三种渠道权利结构下零售商合谋对渠道价格决策的影响。研究表明:无论在何种渠道权利结构下,渠道价格决策不受零售商差异化程度的影响;当产品成本大于临界值时,零售商合谋下的批发价格、零售价格高于零售商之间不存在合谋下的相应价格;零售商合谋会使零售商受益,而制造商会受到损害。当产品成本大于临界值时,任何一方在渠道中处于Stackelberg领导者的地位,均会使消费者的福利增加。在权利结构下,制造商利润水平和零售商利润水平都是最高的。无论在何种渠道权利结构下,如果零售商之间存在合谋,产品差异化程度越大,对制造商越有利,而对零售商有负面效应。

Retailer collusion is a method for improving profit ; it will influence the decision - making conduct of channel pricing. Aiming at the conventional channel structure made by many manufacturers and retailers, the influence of retailer collusion on channel pricing decision tmder three kinds of channel power structure is discussed. The research results are as follows. Regardless of power structttre, retailer differentiation has no impact on the channel pricing decision. When the production cost is above the certain value, the trade price and retailing pricing under retailer collusion are higher than that under non - retailer collusion. Retailer collusion will be of benefit to the retailer, but do the damage to the manufactures. When the production cost is higher than the certain value, no matter which channel member is in the position of Stackelberg leader, consumers will gain the benifit. Under a power structure, the profit levels for the manufacturer and retailer are the highest. Under whichever power structure, if there is collusion between retailers, and the product differentiation is larger, the manufacturer will be better off and will have a negative effect on the retailers.