领导权、隐藏行为与经理报酬:对中国上市公司的经验分析

Managerial Power,Camouflage,and Executive Compensation:An Empirical Study on Listed Companies in China

经理领导权始终是公司治理领域研究的重点。由于败德行为成本的约束作用,经理在运用领导权影响其报酬的过程中实际上包含着隐藏行为。在不同败德行为成本水平下,经理隐藏行为对不同领导权变量与经理报酬之间相关关系会产生不同的影响。本文选取了1998年至2008年期间中国上市公司中3241个样本进行了统计分析。结果显示,两职合一并没有使经理获得较多的报酬租金;盈余管理则相反;独立董事在董事会中的比例在低败德行为成本下可以令经理获得较多的报酬租金。另外,为了更隐蔽地获得报酬租金,经理会根据情境不同在独立董事在董事会中比例以及盈余管理之间进行策略选择。

Managerial power is an important topic in corporate governance. With the constraint of immoral behaviors,camouflage is embraced in the execution of managerial power. This paper focuses on the effect of managerial camouflage on the relation between managerial power and governance variables under different levels of immoral costs. Based on regression analysis on the data of 1652 samples from China listed companies through 1998-2008,the results show that the duality does not make managers obtain more rents,that earning management makes managers obtain more rents,that the percentage of independent directors in board makes managers obtain more rents at lower levels immoral costs,and that managers' choice between earning management and percentage of independent directors in board depends on the specific situations.