不动产抵押贷款的博弈分析与机制设计

Game Analysis and Mechanism Design in Real Estate Mortgage Loan

本文应用完全信息静态博弈模型,对不动产抵押贷款中借款人、评估机构和银行之间的博弈行为进行分析,而且分别讨论了现行两种惩罚策略对降低银行坏账风险的有效性。研究结果表明存在一种激励的悖论:加重对评估机构高估处罚,长期中能减少借款人欺诈概率,降低银行抵押贷款的风险;而加重对借款人欺诈处罚,长期中却能增加评估机构高估的概率。为此,本文设计了评估担保机制,该机制满足激励相容条件,能有效地降低银行的贷款风险。

This paper analyzes the game behaviors of the borrower, the appraisal institution and the bank in real estate mortgage loan with the complete informatinn static game model. In addition, the paper discusses which of the both current fining measures is more effective to reduce the bank＇ s risks. the appraisal institution＇s overvaluation-appraisal will reduce The results show that there＇s an incentive paradox： to fine the probability of borrower＇ s cheat in the long term, which can decrease the bank＇ s mortgage risks; to fine the borrower＇ s cheat will increase the appraisal institution＇ s overvaluationappraisal in the long run. In order to deal with this paradox, an appraisal-warrant mechanism is designed in this article, which conforms to the incentive compatibility principle and can make the risks of the bank＇ s mortgage loan reduced.