具有浪费厌恶决策偏好的供应链收益共享契约模型

Research on revenue-sharing contract of supply chain with a waste-averse supplier

收益共享契约是实现供应链系统绩效改善或完美协调的一种机制。考虑了销售商与供应商分别具有浪费厌恶决策偏好情况下,建立了随机需求下由单供应商和单销售商组成的二级供应链的收益共享契约模型,并对模型进行了分析,揭示了供应商和销售商的浪费厌恶决策偏好对最优订购量、收益分享比例及供应链协作的影响。结果表明:在销售商具有浪费厌恶决策偏好时,供应商所提供的批发价格、所获得的收益份额都将随着销售商浪费厌恶则增加而增加;在供应商具有浪费厌恶决策偏好时,供应商所提供的批发价格、所获得的收益份额都将随着自己的浪费厌恶则增加而减小。

Revenue-sharing （RS） contract is a kind of mechanism to improve the performance or to achieve the perfect coordination of Supply chain （SC）. In this paper, considering that the supplier and the retailer have waste-averse decision bias respectively, we propose a model of an SC contract aiming at coordinating a two-level SC, which is based on revenue sharing mechanism and stochastic customer de explains that how the waste-averse decision bias of the supplier and the quota of revenue sharing, and the coordination of SC. The result mand. Then by analyzing the model, the paper the retailer influences the optimal order quantity, shows： when the retailer has waste-averse decision bias, the wholesale price that supplier offers and the quota that the retailer gives his revenue to the supplier will decrease as the retailer＇s waste-averse decision bias increases; when the supplier has waste-averse decision bias, the wholesale price that he offers the retailer and the quota that the retailer gives his revenue to him will increase as his waste-averse decision bias decreases.