并购失败:管理者利益保护还是经济安全威胁解除?——凯雷收购徐工案例研究

Acquisition Failure:Protecting Management Benefit or Relieving Economic Security from Threat?——Case Study on Carlyle Acquiring Xugong

凯雷集团并购徐工机械是国内第一起由国际私人股权基金获得大型国有企业绝对控股权的案例。文章采用事件研究法,以徐工机械控股的上市公司徐工科技为研究对象,分析了此次并购过程中的五个事件:首次签署并购协议,博客门事件,修订并购协议,二次修订并购协议,协议到期。研究表明上市公司股东在前两个事件中获得了显著的正超常收益,而在后两个事件中的超常收益显著为负,至协议到期并购失败后又获得显著为正的超常收益。从并购过程中的市场反应来看,支持经济安全威胁的证据比支持管理者利益保护的证据更强。

Carlyle acquiring Xugong Machinery was the first case in China that international private equity fund intended to acquire a huge state-owned enterprise and obtain the absolute control right. By means of event study, this paper studies the case of the listed company Xugong Technology Co, Ltd. （XTCL） controlled by Xugong Machinery and analyzes five events in the process of acquisition： signing the initial agreement of acquisition, Blog scandal, revising the agreement of acquisition, revising the agreement of acquisition again, and the agreement being due. This paper shows that shareholders in the listed company obtained significant positive abnormal returns in the first two events, significant negative abnormal returns in the next two events, and significant positive abnormal return in the last event. According to the market reaction to the process of acquisition, evidence supporting economic security is more than that in favor of management benefit protection.