摘要
基于拍卖机制设计理论,针对多个发电权出让方及多个发电权受让方参与的发电权交易市场,提出了一种激励相容的双边拍卖机制。首先描述了发电权双边拍卖交易过程,然后建立了考虑交易成本损耗的数学模型,并在该模型的基础上提出了一种双边拍卖机制,该机制对所有风险规避的发电权出让方及发电权受让方是激励相容和个体理性的,且在该机制下整个系统是弱预算平衡的。算例分析表明所述机制富有效率。
Using mechanism design theory, an incentive compatible double auction mechanism that admits multiple generation rights licensors and generation rights licensees is proposed. Firstly, a double auction process for generation rights trade is described. Secondly, a mathematical model considering various transaction costs is established, and a double auction mechanism based on it is presented. It is proved that the mechanism not only can satisfy incentive compatibility and individual rationality to all risk averse generation rights licensors and generation rights licensees, but also can ensue the total system is weakly budget- balanced. Finally, numerical examples show that the proposed mechanism can achieve high efficiency.
出处
《电力系统自动化》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2009年第22期25-28,78,共5页
Automation of Electric Power Systems
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(60574071)~~
关键词
发电权
双边拍卖
交易成本
激励相容
个体理性
弱预算平衡
效率
generation rights
double auction
transaction costs
incentive compatibility
individual rationality
weak budget-balance
efficiency
