论中国保险市场监管中的诺斯悖论

The North Paradox of Insurance Regulation in China

保险市场监管中的诺斯悖论是指政府本应从公共利益出发,提供公正公平的监管政策,但由于自身利益问题,政府干预行为会出现失灵,导致监管效率下降,损害保单所有人的利益。中国保险市场发展多年,保险监管同样存在诺斯悖论,主要体现为政府监管政策供给不足和供给过剩并存,这源于特殊的中国保险制度、产权背景和保监会定位,可通过政府监管目标、主体、手段和内容的积极调整,尽量修正政府失灵,以化解诺斯悖论。

In insurance regulation, government is expected to serve the public rather than the regulator itself. Yet the fact is to the opposite. Pursuit of self-interest results in the ineffectiveness of government regulation, which hampers the efficiency and threatens the interest of policyholders. This is so-called North Paradox. There are supply insufficiency and also supply surplus in government regulation that derives from China＇s particular insurance system, property fight and positioning of insurance regulatory commission. We can modify inefficiency of government regulation and resolve the North Paradox by properly and proactively adjusting regulation target, organization and measures