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知识论证和Frank Jackson的表征主义回应策略 被引量:2

Knowledge Argument and Frank Jackson's Representationalism Response
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摘要 Jackson对知识论证的表征主义回应策略,认为表征主义能满足回应知识论证所要求的约束问题。但是由于Jackson没有阐明如何对表征特征(感觉)进行物理主义说明,导致其表征主义论证对学习命题的否定,其对玛丽走出房间之后状态的正面说明缺乏牢靠的论证基础,故尔达不到辩护物理主义的目的。 Frank Jackson's newly reply to the Knowledge Argument(KA) argued that representationalism could meet the constraint problem required by the KA.However,because Jackson didn't explain how to give a physical description to his representional characteristics(feel),his denial to the learning proposition and his positive demonstration of the state after Mary out of the house lacked a solid argument foundation,and finally leaded to fail the purpose of defending physicalism.Besides,Jackson's last approval of ability hypothesis was also very confusing.
作者 刘玲
出处 《自然辩证法通讯》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第6期1-6,共6页 Journal of Dialectics of Nature
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  • 1Frank Jackson. Foreword: Loking Back on the Knowledge Argument, P. Ludlow, D. Stoljar, and Y. Nagasaw(ed. ), aw(ed. ), There' s Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument, Cambridge:MIT Press, 2004.
  • 2Frank Jackson. Mind and musion, P. Ludlow, D. Stoljar, and Y. Nagasaw(ed. ), There's Something AboutMary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004,p.432.
  • 3Frank Jackson. Postscript on Qualia, P. Ludlow, D. Stoljar, and Y. Nagasaw(ed.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004,p.419.
  • 4Alter, T. Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument, T. Alter and S. Walter(ed. ), Phenomena/Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalisrn, New York: Oxford University Press,2007,p.66.
  • 5Frank Jackson. Some Reflections on Representationalim,http://www. nyu. edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness/papers/RepresentationalismNYU5April00. PDF, 2000, p. 4.
  • 6Frank Jackson. The Knowledge Argument, Diaphanousness, Representationalism, T. Alter and S. Walter(ed. ), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007,p.57.

同被引文献31

  • 1蒉益民.知识论证与物理主义[J].社会科学战线,2006(3):8-13. 被引量:9
  • 2Chalmers, D. , 2003, "Consciousness and its place in nature", in S. Stich, T. Warfield ( eds. ) , The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell Publishing.
  • 3Churchland, P. , 2004, "Knowing qualia: a reply to Jackson (with postsript: 1997 )", in P. Ludlow, D. Stoljar, Y. Nagasaw (eds.),There's Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument, MIT Press.
  • 4Conee, E. , 1994, "Phenomenal knowledge", in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72.
  • 5Dennett, D. , 1991, Consciouzness Explained, Little Brown and Company.
  • 6Dennett, D. 2007, "What RoboMary knows", in T. Alter and S. Walter (eds.) , Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, New Oxford University Press.
  • 7Fodor, J. , 1992, "The big idea", in The Times Literary Supplement 3.
  • 8Gulick, R.V. , 2004, "So many ways of saying no to Mary", in P. Ludlow, D. Stoljar and Y. Nagasawa ( eds. ), There's Something abo- ut Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Conaciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument, MIT Press.
  • 9Gulick, R.V. 2008, "Jackson's change of mind: representationalism, a priorism and the knowledge argument", in I. Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • 10Hill, C., 1997, "Imaginability, conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem", in Philosophical Studies 87.

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