集体林权改革后生态公益林的监管与补偿机制探讨

The exploring of the regulation and compensation mechanism about ecological commonweal forest after collective forest tenure reform

林改后生态公益林的生态效益与承包家庭经济效益存在矛盾,目前针对生态公益林的固定补贴政策不能实现保护生态与提高林农收入的双赢目标。生态公益林个人承包后,政府和林农信息不对称,私自盗伐不易监督,基层管理难度较大,森林风险集中化。通过假设关于经营绩效的线性补偿机制,将违法成本以概率函数期望的形式纳入模型,计算国家单位面积生态公益林的激励性补偿系数的最优值;分析加强基层监管力度对增大违法成本的作用方式,阐明对林农按照每年经营绩效进行线性补偿的方案的理论依据。

After collective forest tenure reform, there are contradictions between the ecoefficiency of ecological forest and the contracting family＇s economic benefits. At present, the fixed subsidy policy for ecological commonweal forest cannot achieve the double win goal which are the ecological protection and the enhancement of contracting family＇s revenue. After the individual contracts of ecological forest, the issue of information asymmetry between the government and the foresters becomes serious, the private illegal cutting is difficult to supervise, the basal management becomes more difficult, and the forest risk becomes concentrated. We assuming a linear compensation model which would hook the business performance with family＇s income, taking the law-break- ing cost into the model with the form of probability function expectation, calculating the national＇s optimal values of coefficients on the incentive compensation for the per unit area ecological forest, analyzing the way that enhancing basal supervison to increase law - breaking cost functions, and clarifying the theoretical basis of the linear compensation program for families.