专利法:一种博弈论视角下的合作机制

Patent Law:A Cooperative Mechanism in the Perspective of Game Theory

本文试图用博弈论的方法来探究专利法机制设计的合理性。作者以没有专利制度的假设为逻辑起点,通过构建发明人-投资人博弈模型,认为专利法是解决"囚徒困境"的有效机制。在一个有效运行的专利制度下,发明人会积极申请专利,而投资人也会积极投资于这些专利技术。专利法用排他权给发明人提供正向激励,用专利无效宣告程序给发明人提供反向激励;用完全准确披露的技术信息给投资人提供正向激励,用专利侵权责任给投资人提供反向激励。通过这种制度设计,就可以改变博弈的原初结构,让双方在一个良好的制度框架内进行合作,从而促进技术的进步和创新。

This paper focuses on the rationality of patent law in the perspective of game theory. With the assumption of the absence of a patent system, the paper has built an inventor-investor game model by borrowing the theory of 'prisoner’s dilemma'. The main argument is that patent law is an efficient mechanism to solve such a dilemma. In an efficient functioning patent system, inventors would be willing to apply for the patent protection, whereas investors would be willing to invest in the technology. Patent law grants exclusive rights to inventors as positive incentives and invalidates flawed patents as negative incentives. Meanwhile it guarantees investors’ access to fully disclosed technical information as encouragement, and imposes liability on them in case of patent infringement. This subtle arrangement changes the original structure of the game, and enables the two sides to cooperate with each other in a well-developed legal frame of patent law, and thus promotes technological innovation and progress.