终极控制人、金字塔控制与控股股东的“掏空”行为研究

The Ultimate Controller,Pyramidal Structure and Tunneling: Evidence from China's Listed Companies

以我国上市公司2004～2007年相关数据为基础，从终极控制人的股权属性、金字塔控制结构、控制权和现金流权的分离3个维度对上市公司纵向股权结构与控股股东的“掏空”行为进行了实证研究。结果发现：中央政府控制的上市公司被控股股东“掏空”的总程度最小，地方政府和自然人控制的上市公司被控股股东“掏空”的总程度没有显著差异；政府控制的控股股东更多地通过生产性经营来“掏空”上市公司，自然人控制的股东则更多地通过非经营性方式来“掏空”上市公司；自然人对上市公司的金字塔控制层级越多，控制权和现金流权的分离程度越大，控股股东对上市公司的“掏空”行为越严重；在中央政府控制的上市公司中，金字塔控制层级越少，控制股东的“掏空”行为越严重，控制权和现金流权有分离的上市公司被控股股东占用的资金高于控制权和现金流权没有分离的公司。

Based on the data about China＇s listed companies over period 2004-2007,this paper analyzes the type of ultimate controller, pyramidal structure and the separation between controlling shareholders＇ control rights and cash flow rights to investigate the relationship between vertical ownership structure and controlling shareholder＇s embezzlement of listed company＇s funds, which is a proxy of tunneling. The results indicate： i） the degree of controlling shareholders＇ tunneling in the central government ultimately controlled companies is the least, the degrees of controlling shareholder＇s tunneling in the natural person and local government ultimately controlled companies don＇t have significant differences; ii） controlling shareholders in government ultimately controlled companies tunnel through productive operation while controlling shareholders in natural person ultimately controlled companies tunnel through non-productive method; iii ） the more the pyramidal structure layers in natural person controlled companies and the bigger the degree of the separation between the ultimate controller＇s control rights and cash flow rights,the more severe the tunneling of controlling shareholders; iv） in central government controlled companies , the less the pyramidal structure layers and the more severe the tunneling of controlling shareholders ,the capital occupied by the controlling shareholder in companies that have separation between control rights and cash flow rights is more than that in companies that don＇t have.