摘要
尝试从新制度经济学的委托代理关系角度,分析我国住房公积金制度管理方面的失范与不足。从政治委托代理关系和经济委托代理关系两方面,揭示出我国住房公积金制度发展过程中一切矛盾的焦点是由于其定位不准确,委托代理链效率低下。从新的视角对住房公积金制度的改革提出对策。
This article tries to analyse the anomie and deficiency of the housing accumulation fund system on the point of the principal-agent relationships in the New Institutional Economics,through the political principal-agent relationship and the economic principal-agent relationship to reveal that the focus of all conflicts under development of our country 's housing accumulation fund system is the inaccurate of its location and the inefficiencies of lhe prineipal-agent ehain, in order to give counsel to the housing fund system reform from a new perspective.
出处
《价值工程》
2009年第12期35-38,共4页
Value Engineering
关键词
住房公积金制度
委托代理关系
激励约束机制
对策
housing accumulation fund system
principal-agent relation
incentive and restraint mechanisms
countermeasures