二级委托代理问题研究:来自委托理财的经验证据

Research on Hierarchical Agency Problem:Empirical Evidence from Entrusted Investment

将中国上市公司的委托理财行为,作为二级委托代理问题的典型代表,文章运用Logistic回归方法研究了2000年到2004年的上市公司委托理财,发现两类因素——公司层面的因素和所有权层面的因素,会影响这种组织关系的建立:"自由现金量"与委托理财发生概率显著正相关,而传统的"自由现金流"理论没有得到实证证据的支持;第一大股东持股比例越高,越可能发生委托理财,重要股东数越多,发生委托理财的概率越低。在控制了资产负债率、公司规模等变量之后,结果依然不变。

Taken the entrusted investment as a typical case of Hierarchical Agency problem, this paper investigates the entrusted investment from 2000 to 2004, using a Logistic regression. The empirical evidence suggests that two classes of factors, both in the firm level and the ownership level, will affect the happening of this Hierarchical Agency problem. The ＂free cash stock＂ is positively related with the possibility of entrusted investment, and no evidence is found to support the classic ＂free cash flow＂ theory. The possibility of entrusted investment is also positively related with the share proportion of the large-shareholder while it is related with the number of important shareholders negatively, even after controlling other factors such as debt-to-asset ratio and firm size.