摘要
研究一个生产商和两个零售商组成的二层供应链,生产商首先决定批发价和零售商选址约束,然后两个零售商进行选址和定价二阶段动态博弈。利用Hotelling模型得到了零售商价格竞争均衡的存在性条件,分析了集中式控制下供应链的最优选址和定价决策,提出了带转移支付的批发价合同和选址约束来协调零售商选取供应链最优决策。同时,带转移支付的批发价合同能激励零售商降低销售成本。
A two-level supply chain, consisting of one manufacturer and two retailers, is studied, where the manufacturer presets the wholesale prices and location restrictions, then two retailers competes in a two-stage dynamic game, i. e., they compete in price after they choose their locations simultaneously. The conditions for retailers' equilibrium prices are obtained by using Hotelling model. The optimal locating and pricing decisions of supply chain under the centralized control are analyzed. This paper puts forward a wholesale price contract with transfer payment and location restrictions to coordinate the retailers choosing the supply chain optimal locations and prices. It .shows that the contract can simultaneously inspirit the retailers to reduce cost.
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第4期54-58,共5页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70432001)
中国博士后基金资助项目(20060400584)
江西省自科基金资助项目(2007GZS2120)