基于策略型消费者的最优订购决策

The Optimal Ordering Decision in the Views of Consumers' Strategic Behavior

随着互联网的发展,厂商改变价格的成本越来越小,动态定价机制也越来越受到厂商的青睐。然而,消费者在信息相对充分的情形下,会对厂商未来的价格产生预期,而不是当价格低于自身的保留价格就会马上购买,从而产生观望等待。通过运用博弈论中经典的Stackelberg博弈模型,讨论在消费者的这种策略行为下,厂商如何决定最优的初始订购数量。结论表明,忽视消费者的策略行为将会导致厂商的利润严重损失,消费者的风险厌恶虽然很大一部分程度可以缓冲消费者自身策略行为给厂商带来的不利影响,但随着消费者风险厌恶程度的减少,消费者的策略行为对厂商带来的负面影响越来越大。厂商可以通过适当的库存数量,增大消费者买不到产品的风险,从而减少消费者的等待行为。

The traditional newsvendor model has been always used in the operation management to solve the inventory problem when the manufactures face uncertainty demand. But with the competition of the product and the changing of marketing environment, the manufactures have to use many promotions, such as reducing the price, in order to promote the sale. At the same time, consumers behave strategically and weigh their payoff of immediate purchase against the expected payoff of delaying their purchases. The inevitable consequence is a vicious cycle ： consumers expect increasingly generous discounts, and manufactures have to cut deeper and deeper of the price. In our model, we use the classical newsvendor problem model and the rational expectation equilibrium, based on the strategy behavior of the consumer, consider how a monopoly manufacture chooses his inventory at the beginning to make the maximized profit.