乡镇污染企业与政府监管的博弈分析及对策思考

Game Analysis and Countermeasures Between the government Supervision and the Pollution Township Enterprise

乡镇企业的污染治理存在外部经济性,因此需要政府的干预。然而在农村,乡镇企业与政府之间利益的一致性导致政府环境监管不力。本文从博弈论的角度,分析研究政府环境监管与乡镇企业治理污染的决策过程及博弈结果,指出降低企业的治污成本、增加对排污企业的罚款金额、降低税率、提高政府的监管效率以及增加政府的失职责任等可以增加企业治理污染的概率。

The government should intervene the pollution control on the township enterprises because There is external economic. But in rural areas, township enterprises and the government＇s interests led to failure of the environmental supervision. From the perspective of game theory, this paper analysis the decision - making process and the outcome of the game between the government supervision and the pollution township enterprises, then points out that reduction the cost of pollution control, increasing the amount of penalty in enterprises, lower taxes, increasing government efficiency and to increase the dereliction of duty in government can increase the probability of pollution control.