寄售合同的设计与拍卖研究

The Research about the Design and Auction of a Consignment Contract

分析了零售商面对多个供应商竞争有限销售渠道资源时的供应商选择策略以及收益分配机制。供应商的产能成本参数为供应商的私有信息,产能成本参数独立同分布。供应商以寄售模式销售某产品,负责产品的补货,零售商仅承担产品库存管理费用。为识别产能成本最低的供应商,零售商将分享总销售收益的比例设计为供应商产能成本的函数,并将包含此函数的寄售合同当作物品在多个供应商间进行拍卖。供应商对此寄售机会进行估价,并以自己的估价进行竞标,竞标价最高的供应商将提前支付一笔进场费给零售商,从而赢得此寄售机会。这种寄售合同拍卖机制能够同时解决供应商选择与确定理想的分享收益比例的问题,对实践中采用的进场费的确定问题给出了解释。最后通过数值算例分析了相关参数对零售商以及获胜供应商的期望收益的影响。

We analyze the problem that how to select the best supplier and how to determine the fraction of revenue shared by the retailer. The supplier＇ s capacity cost is the supplier＇ s private information and these costs are independent identity distribution variables. The supplier adopts the consignment policy to replenish the product,and the retailer bears the holding cost. In order to identify the supplier with the lowest cost, the retailer proposes a consignment contract that specifies the revenue sharing ratio as a function on the supplier＇s capacity cost and auctions the contract among the suppliers. The supplier evaluates the supply chance with his own capacity cost bid with his evaluation. The lowest capacity cost will propose the highest bidding and win the contract. The mechanism can help the retailer to determine the best supplier and the ratio simultaneously and give an explanation of the entrance fee in practice. At the last, we give a numerical and sensitive analysis.