多对一供应链收入共享契约中的采购优化

Purchasing optimization based on revenue-sharing contracts under many-to-one supply chain structure

为研究多对一供应链结构中基于契约协商的采购优化策略问题及其对改善供应链绩效的影响,针对该供应链结构中零售商具有内生保留利润的特点,建立了以制造商为主方、零售商为从方的Stackelberg主从对策模型;给出了在制造商提供契约条款的对称博弈中,零售商采购策略存在唯一最优解、制造商间的博弈存在唯一对称纳什均衡最优解的证明;讨论了收入共享契约下分散供应链决策同集中供应链决策的关系,限定了该结构中供应链协调的条件。最后,通过仿真实验分析验证了契约参数及产品的可替代性对供应链绩效的影响。

To study purchasing optimization strategy based on contract negotiations and their influences on improving the performance of supply chain composed of competing multi-manufacturers and an independent and common retailer, according to the fact that the retailer was with an endogenous reservation profit, a Stackelberg game model was constructed in which manufacturers were leaders and the retailer was the follower. Then, the retailer＇s purchasing strategy had a unique optimal solution, and the game among multiple manufacturers had a unique optimal symmetric Nash equilibrium solution with manufacturers simultaneously announcing revenue-sharing contracts, were proved. Relationship of decisions between centralized and decentralized supply chain under revenue-sharing contracts was discussed. And the condition for coordinating the supply chain was defined. Inflences of system parameters and products＇ substitutability level on the supply chain performance were further analyzed and verified through a simulation experiment at last.