基于交易费用理论的大部制改革分析

Discussion on Giant Department Reform from the Perspective of Transaction Cost Theory

政府组织成员的逐利本性决定了政府交易行为的存在,政府部门交易的实质是同类公共事务管理权和管理责任的跨部门转移。现行大部制改革尽管降低了部门交易的协调、信息和控制成本,但同时也引起了部门内部管理成本的上涨,当大部门的规模扩张至边际交易费用与边际管理成本相等时,静态均衡就实现了。简单的部门合并并非是治愈政府运转失调、效率低下的良方,只有明确交易主体的职责权限、减少交易频率和交易的不确定性,才能从根本上降低政府交易费用,建立有效的政治市场。

The profit-oriented nature of government members determines the existence of government transactions, the substance of the government departments transaction was the inter-departmental transfer of management authority and responsibility for the similar public affairs. Although the giant department reform saves the costs of coordination, information and control, it also increases the internal management-costs. The size of government departments will expand to the equilibrium where the marginal management-costs equal the marginal transaction-costs. Simple merging is not a good prescription to cure the imbal- ance and inefficient operation of government. Only with clear definition on the powers and responsibilities of the transaction bodies, and reducing transaction frequency and uncertainty, the transaction costs will be controlled effectively, and the effective political market will be established.