剩余控制权的不同形式及其对公司治理的影响被引量：5

Different Kinds of Residual Control Rights and Their Effects on Corporate Governance

导出

摘要在GHM不完全合同基准模型中,剩余控制权来源于物资资产的财产所有权。伴随企业组织形态多样化复杂化的发展趋势,GHM模型中古典意义的剩余控制权也呈现出更多的表现形式。根据剩余控制权的不同来源,本文将其细分为直接控制权和间接控制权两种形式。间接控制权及控制权收益的普遍存在使得公司治理理论关注的焦点从剩余控制权的有效配置转移到了剩余控制权的有效行使上,相应的公司治理实践也发生了变化。 In the benchmark model of GHM incomplete contract theory, residual control rights derives from property ownership. With the diversification and complication trend of firm organization, residual control fights gains more forms. Based on the source of residual control rights, we discussed direct control rights and indirect control rights in the article. Different control rights corresponds different incentive problems. High private benefits attached to indirect control rights shift the focus of corporate govern- ance theory from the best allocation of control rights to its effective exertion. Therefore the practice of corporate governance changes.

作者李双金郑育家

机构地区上海社会科学院经济研究所上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院

出处《上海经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第12期62-67,共6页 Shanghai Journal of Economics

基金国家自然科学基金项目(70802038) 上海市哲学社会科学规划课题(2008EJB006)资助

关键词剩余控制权控制权收益公司治理 Residual Control Rights Private benefit of control Corporate governance

分类号 F276.6 [经济管理—企业管理]

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