期刊文献+

认知网络中基于连续双向拍卖的动态频谱分配 被引量:5

Dynamic spectrum allocation based on continuous double auctions in cognitive radio networks
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摘要 非合作认知无线电网络中,多个主用户和多个第2用户并存.主用户和第2用户是自私的和理性的,主用户和第2用户都希望在不影响他人收益的前提下获得自己的最大收益.这符合连续双向拍卖市场对用户的假设条件.针对这一特点,基于实验经济学理论,提出了基于模糊逻辑连续双向拍卖的动态频谱分配策略.在频谱拍卖过程中,主用户和第2用户均采用基于模糊逻辑的报价策略.采用该方法,主用户和第2用户可以根据交易情况实时调整自己的报价步长,减少报价次数,迅速完成交易.仿真结果表明该方法的频谱分配效率为85%,较好地解决了非合作认知网络中多对多环境下的动态频谱分配问题. Multiple primary and multiple secondary users coexist in non-cooperation cognitive networks. All primary and secondary users are selfish and rational with the hope of acquiring the maximum gain on condition that they do not harm the profits of others, which accords with the hypothesis of users in continuous double auctions. For this characteristic, dynamic spectrum allocation based on fuzzy-logic continuous double auctions is proposed, based on the theory of experimental economics. In spectrum auctions, every user uses bidding strategy based on the fuzzy-logic. With this method, they can adjust their bidding steps in time according to the business situation, and reduce the time of bid to finish the business rapidly. Simulation results show that our proposed scheme has 85% efficiency of spectrum usage. Dynamic Spectrum allocation in the multi-to-multi situation in non-cooperation cognitive networks is solved effectively with the method proposed in the paper.
出处 《西安电子科技大学学报》 EI CAS CSCD 北大核心 2009年第6期996-1002,共7页 Journal of Xidian University
基金 国家自然科学基金资助(60672129 60706027) 新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助(NCET-07-0653) 国家863高技术研究发展计划资助(2007AA01Z182 2009AA01Z237) 高等学校学科创新引智计划资助(B08038) 长江学者和创新团队发展计划资助 陕西省自然科学基金资助(SJ08F09)
关键词 认知无线电 模糊逻辑 拍卖 动态频谱分配 cognitive radio fuzzy-logic auctions dynamic spectrum allocation
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参考文献19

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同被引文献53

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