基于委托代理理论的弱化牛鞭效应的对策研究

Research on Countermeasures of Weakening the Bullwhip Effect Based on Principal-agent Theory

首先阐释了牛鞭效应的内涵,并从博弈论的角度深入分析了牛鞭效应产生的根本原因,进而提出了强化牛鞭效应的短缺博弈问题,最后基于委托代理理论中的道德风险问题的分析框架,给出了弱化牛鞭效应的对策。

This paper, we firstly explained the ＂Bullwhip Effect＂, then analyzed the causes of ＂Bullwhip Effect＂from the perspeetive Of game theory, on basis of this; put forward the ＂BullWhip Effect＂ in Strengthening the issue of the shortage of game; finally, based onthe analytical framework of moral risk in the principal.agent theory, the paper made Some countermeasures weakening the ＂Bullwhip Effect＂.