风险投资多阶段动态信号博弈分析

Game analysis of multi-staged dynamic signal in venture capital

在建立的多阶段动态信号博弈模型中,风险投资家通过分阶段投资契约安排,实现了对创业企业家的有限控制.这不仅避免了一次博弈机械地出现创业企业家和风险投资家依次行动所导致的信息不对称,而且通过引入时间变量产生对创业企业家的可信性威胁,从而使创业企业家有激励提高风险资本的期望产出值,也使风险投资家有积极性选择期望产出最大化的投资水平.

A game model of multi - staged dynamic signal is established, in which the staged financing is utilized by investors to partly control entrepreneurs. It mitigates the information asymmetry in one game played by investors and entrepreneurs with each other in turn,, nd produces threat to the creditability of entrepreneurs through introducing time variable so as to stimulate them to enhance the expectation output value. Moreover, it is helpful for investors to select the maximum investment to bring the maximum output.