战略网络结点企业激励契约的设计研究

Study of the Strategic Network Incentive Contract Design

首先以完全信息下的激励契约为标杆,分析了避免成员企业道德风险的单期静态激励契约;其次基于网络成员间合作的长期性,提出了多期动态激励契约的设计,并得出核心企业对双方关系未来价值的评价影响合作关系的持续性的结论。

Using the incentive contract under absolute information for benchmark, this paper firstly analyzes the single-period static incentive contract to avoid moral hazard from member firms; Secondly, based on the long-term cooperation relationships between firms, this paper advances the multi-periods dynamic incentive contract and concludes that the cooperation evaluation of core finn will have a great effect on cooperation relationships between firms in strategic network.