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商业银行信贷的道德风险分析及防范措施

Analysis and Preventive Measures of the Moral Hazard in Commercial Banks
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摘要 针对商业银行信贷中的道德风险,运用博弈理论,在系统分析了商业银行与贷款企业之间为使自己利润最大化的博弈特点的基础上,分别构建了贷款实施过程和还款阶段的博弈模型,并求解了该模型,通过对求解结果的进一步分析,得到了有价值的结论,从而有针对性地提出了防范商业银行信贷中的道德风险的政策措施和建议。 According to the moral hazard in credit of commercial bank, the paper, using the game theory, firstly systematically analyses the game characteristics of profit maximization between commercial bank and loan enterprise, and then it construets the game models of implementation process of loans and repayment phase, and gets the solution. Through further anglicizing the solving results, the paper obtains valuable conclusions, thus it puts forward policy measures and suggestions of moral hazard of preventing commercial bank loans.
出处 《武汉理工大学学报》 CAS CSCD 北大核心 2009年第24期145-147,156,共4页 Journal of Wuhan University of Technology
基金 国家自然科学基金(60574071)
关键词 商业银行 道德风险 博弈论 commercial bank moral hazard game theory
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