自由现金流量的代理成本:理论和证据

On the Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow: Theory and Evidence

如果公司存在自由现金流量,管理者可能会超额在职消费、或过度投资、或闲置,管理者的这些机会主义行为造成的股东财富损失,就是自由现金流量的代理成本。根据美国财务学家Jensen的思想,重新设计了一种自由现金流量的度量方法,使用我国775家上市公司的面板数据进行实证检验,结果表明,闲置资金、过度投资和随意性支出都显著地与自由现金流量正相关。自由现金流量越多,就意味着代理成本越高,因而必须控制自由现金流量。

If a company has free cash flow （abbr. FCF）, the management may have such behaviors as excessive job consumption, over-investment, or idled cash. These kinds of opportunistic behaviors of the management may result in loss of shareholders＇ wealth, and that is called the agency costs of FCF. According to American financial scientist Jensen＇ s idea, this paper develops a new method to measure FCF and conducts an empirical test by making use of the panel data of China＇ s 775 listed companies. The results indicate that the idled funds, over-investment and discretionary expenditure have an obvious positive relation with FCF. More FCF means more agency costs, therefore, FCF must be kept under control.