公司经理人持股的委托代理模型拓展研究

Extended Research on Principal-agent Model for Company Managers′ Stock Holding

经理人持有公司股份时,可以减少公司的代理成本;上市公司经理人比非上市公司经理人面临更大的风险成本,其努力程度也增大,同时其业绩分享系数也变大;经理人业绩分享系数随着其持股比例的增大而减小,而上市公司经理人业绩分享系数减小幅度比非上市公司大。

Through extended studying on the traditional principal-agent model,we have gained many meaningful conclusions on the principal-agent problems of the corporation managers′ stock holding.The results show that： the company can reduce agency costs when the managers hold shares;listed companies managers face greater risk cost than unlisted companies,and they must increase the extension of their efforts.At the same time,their performance sharing coefficient also becomes larger;managers′ performance sharing coefficient will be reduced following with the increase of the proportion of their stock holding.Listed companies have a larger decrease magnitude in mangers′ performance sharing coefficient than unlisted companies′.