合作博弈框架下企业内部权力的分配被引量：34

Allocation of Power within a Firm:A Co-operative Game Model

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摘要以交易成本经济学理论以及不完全契约理论为代表的最优契约设计理论,在逻辑上并没有解决企业中权力的来源、分配与可实施问题;Aoki发展起的合作博弈框架尽管解决了权力可实施问题,但并没有使决定权力分配的讨价还价能力内生化。本文认为:真实企业中的权力是缔约各方讨价还价的结果,惟其如此,企业内部的权力不仅存在而且是能自我执行的;而企业内要素拥有者谈判力的大小以及由此导致的控制权的大小,又是由该要素在市场上的相对重购成本决定的。此外,对风险的态度将影响到讨价还价能力。 The theory of constructing the first-best contract, represented by TCE （transaction cost economics） and GHM （Grossman-Hart-Moore）, doesn＇t solve the problem of source, allocation and enforceability of power within the firm. Bargaining power in the co-operative game model developed by Aoki isn＇ t endogenetic. Under the framework of co-operative game theory, we can educe the conclusion below： The power within a real firm is the outcome of bargaining between contractors, whose size of control power is determined by his size of bargaining power. Only by this, the power within a firm is not only existent but auto-selfenforcing. And the size of bargaining power and thus the control power within a firm is determined by the size of substitutable and in inverse proportion to latter. Moreover, the attitude to risk can affect bargaining power and thus the allocation of power within a firm.

作者卢周来

机构地区中国国防大学经济研究中心

出处《经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第12期106-118,共13页 Economic Research Journal

关键词企业理论权力分配讨价还价能力合作博弈 Theory of Firm Allocation of Power Bargaining Power Co- operative Game

分类号 F271 [经济管理—企业管理] F224.32 [经济管理—国民经济]

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