我国银行业监管体系分析——基于监管偏好与反管制的视角

Regulatory System of Banking in China——An Analysis Based on Regulate Preference and Anti-regulation Perspective

由于政府失灵和市场失灵同样重要,如何理解中国银行业的管制现状,是构建符合中国现实的银行业监管体系的基础。与其他文献不同的是,本文首先对作为监管供给方的监管机构进行分析和假定,指出中国银行业监管者呈现出监管过度、监管租金和监管社会发展的三大偏好特征。然后从被监管者角度,探讨不同监管偏好的表现形式及相应的银行业反管制行为。以国有化、市场准入及繁杂且冲突的条文为特征的过度监管导致银行业金融稳定、指标良好但监管激励不相容,监管租金偏好产生了不同形式的金融腐败,而监管社会发展偏好导致银行业商业化运作不强且资产质量呈现不确定性。依据上述分析逻辑,本文提出构建中国银行业监管体系的建议,即银行业微观主体改造是基础,弱化监管者多重偏好是前提,监管制度的合理化与高度化是根本内容。

Differing from others, this paper analyzes supervisory institution as supply side of regulation at first. We find regulator of bank industry in China show mainly three regulate preferences of over-supervision preference, rent preference and social-development preference. And then the paper also analysis anti-regulate behavior of bank industry under different regulate preferences of the regulator. Finally, we suggest that the banking regulatory system should be based on the formation of banking system with reasonable and orderly pattern. The reform also needs weakening of multiple preferences in regulation as its institutional premise and supervisory system＇s rationalization and development as its operational assurance.