我国中小企业信用担保引入政府补贴的可行性探讨:基于博弈论的视角

Game Analysis On The Feasibility Of Government Subsidy For Credit Guarantee Of SMEs In China

信用担保制度对于支持中小企业贷款非常重要,然而现实中担保市场门槛众多,许多中小企业无法获得担保,也限制了担保业的自身发展。本文在前人研究的基础上采用博弈论研究方法得出由于存在正的外部效应,政府应鼓励商业担保机构的发展并采用补贴的方法降低其收费,从而为更多中小企业提供担保,改善其融资环境,进而实现更为有效的纳什均衡,以利于宏观经济长期发展和当前就业问题的解决。

Credit guarantee plays an important role in supporting the financing of small and medium enterprises （SMEs）. However, many SMEs are denied of this instrument for there are lots of limits in guarantee market. The article reaches a conclusion that the government should provide subsidies for those commercial guarantee organizations so that more SMEs can have access to credit guarantee and also have a better financing environment. In this case, a more effective Nash Equilibrium can be achieved, which is good for the long-run development of micro-economy and labor market.