“小业主大咨询”模式下建设项目业主驻勤人员激励监督机制研究——以京沪高速铁路建设项目为背景

Research on the Incentive and Supervision Mechanism under"Small Proprietor and Big Consultation" Model in Construction Project Management——On the background of Beijing-Shanghai high-speed railway construction project

本文以京沪高速铁路建设项目为背景,从委托代理理论的角度对"小业主大咨询"管理模式下监理职能的延伸问题进行了研究,提炼出"双代理"委托代理模型,认为"双代理"是具有中国特色的建设项目委托代理问题。在此基础上,进一步分析了驻勤人员的激励和约束机制,讨论了在固定工资和绩效工资两种契约形式下,监督力度、综合素质等因素对驻勤人员努力选择的影响,以及在最优努力选择下影响业主收益的主要因素,为建立"小业主,大咨询"模式下驻勤人员激励和监督机制的建立提供了理论依据。

From the perspective of principal-agent theory, this paper studies the problem of extended supervision functions, called ＂double-agency＂, on the background of Beijing-Shanghai high-speed railway construction project. In this paper, we find that ＂double-agency＂ is a principal agency problem typical of China. Furthermore, we discuss the main factors that impact the agency behavior choices and the benefit of proprietor, such as supervision and comprehensive quality etc, and provide a theoretical basis for ＂small proprietor and big consultation＂ mechanisms.