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信息披露质量与代理成本的实证研究——基于深圳证券交易所信息披露考评的经验证据 被引量:49

An Empirical Study on the Relationship between Disclosure Quality and Agency Cost——Evidence from Disclosure Evaluation of Shenzhen Stock Exchange
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摘要 信息披露是资本市场有效运行的重要机制之一,其质量高低对于代理成本有着重要影响。文章以2001年到2006年深圳证券交易所的上市公司作为研究样本,深圳证券交易所对上市公司信息披露考评作为信息披露质量的替代变量,应用多元回归与Heckman两阶段回归实证研究了信息披露质量对于代理成本的影响。实证结果显示,高质量的信息披露可以显著地降低代理成本。文章研究为信息披露质量与代理成本之间的关系提供了直接的经验证据。 Information disclosure is a very important mechanism for capital market, and its quality has a considerable impact on agency cost. Taking listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2006 as samples, and disclosure evaluation of Shenzhen Stock Exchange as agency variable of disclosure quality, this paper analyzes how the information disclosure quality influences agency cost. By applying multivariable regression and Heckman "two-stage" model, we find that higher disclosure quality can reduce agency cost significantly, We provide direct empirical evidence on the relationship between information disclosure quality and agency cost.
出处 《商业经济与管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第12期76-82,90,共8页 Journal of Business Economics
基金 国家社会科学基金项目(07CJY010) 教育部应急研究课题(2009JYJR033)
关键词 信息披露质量 代理成本 公司治理 自选择偏差 information disclosure quality agency cost corporate governance self-selection bias
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参考文献27

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