信仰:内在形而上学的实践能力——康德《实践理性批判》中的一个根基性问题

Faith:Practical Capability of Internal Metaphysics——One key issue in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason

形而上学是人类的自然倾向。根据形而上学对象——"绝对"对于人类认识和实践活动来说是"超越"的还是"内在"的,形而上学应该被区分为"外在形而上学"和"内在形而上学"。康德的《纯粹理性批判》确立的是外在形而上学,而《实践理性批判》确立的则是内在形而上学。作为内在形而上学的自然倾向,其实践活动最终落实在"信仰"上面。信仰作为人类满足内在形而上学要求的活动,是通过信仰的实践来完成的,它不必把"信仰"变成"知识"的理论活动来完成关于"绝对"的思辨知识。在这个意义上,"信仰"的最高意义仅仅在实践理性之中,而不在理论理性之中。

Metaphysics is the natural inclination of mankind. According to the object of metaphysics--＂ absoluteness＂ is ＂surpass＂ or ＂internal＂ for men＇s cognition and practical activities, so metaphysics should be treated as ＂external metaphysics＂ and ＂internal metaphysics＂. Kant＇s Critique of Pure Reason establishes external metaphysics, while his Critique of Practical Reason internal one. As for natural inclination of internal metaphysics, its practical activity is finally rooted in ＂faith＂. Faith as activities of men＇ s meeting the requirements of internal metaphysics is accomplished by faith practice, and it is not necessary to change ＂faith＂ to ＂knowledge＂ theoretical activities and then to complete speculative knowledge of ＂absoluteness＂. In such a sense, the highest meaning of ＂faith＂ only exists not in theoretical reason but in reasonable practice.