期刊文献+

武器装备保障供应链中基于绩效的整体外包机制 被引量:10

Performance Based Entire Outsourcing Mechanism in Weaponry Support Supply Chain
原文传递
导出
摘要 传统的武器装备保障是军方体制内的保障,供应商只负责提供装备,因而供应商没有动力提高装备可靠性,保障成本也比较高。针对这种弊端,本文提出了一种基于绩效的保障服务整体外包模式,即由供应商负责从提供装备到完成装备保障任务的整个供应链,军方根据保障的绩效水平通过合同进行一定的奖励和惩罚。本文运用委托代理的研究模型,分析了这种保障模式的优势。结果表明,军方一定的激励政策可以引导供应商努力提高装备可靠性,并使其获得更好的收入;与此同时,军方保障的总成本也得到降低,供应链绩效得到改善。 The traditional weaponry support function is performed within the military system. Suppliers only provide weapons, thus they have no motive to improve the weaponry reliability. The cost of weaponry support is high. To solve this problem, we bring forward a new mechanism of the entire supply outsourcing based on the performance. The suppliers are responsible for the whole supply chain tasks from providing weapons to weaponry support. The military gives rewards or punishments according to the suppliers performance. The advantages of this kind of mechanism are analyzed through a principal-agent model. The results show that the military can use certain incentive policies to induce the suppliers to improve the weaponry reliability and meanwhile enhance their incomes. The total cost of the military's weaponry supports also can be reduced, and the performance of the whole supply chain is improved.
出处 《中国管理科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第6期91-97,共7页 Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70972030 70532004)
关键词 武器装备保障 服务外包 委托代理 备件库存 weaponry support service outsourcing principal-agent service parts inventory
  • 相关文献

参考文献19

  • 1Hartley,K.. The economics of military outsourcing[J]. Defence Studies, 2004,4(2) :199-205.
  • 2Fredland,J. E.. Outsourcing military force: A transactions cost perspective on the role of military companies [J]. Defence and Peace Economics, 2004,15(3):205-- 219.
  • 3吴鸣,刘军.装备维修保障外包经济学分析[J].装备指挥技术学院学报,2006,17(2):5-9. 被引量:5
  • 4范体军,陈荣秋,崔南方.设备维护外包策略分析[J].中国管理科学,2003,11(4):47-53. 被引量:25
  • 5Quinn, J. B. , Hilmer, F. G.. Strategic outsourcing[J]. Sloan Management Review, 1994,35(4) :43--55.
  • 6Cachon, C-. P. , Lariviere, M. A.. Contracting to as sure supply: How to share demand forecasts in a supply Chain[J]. Management Science, 2001, 47(5):629-- 646.
  • 7高俊山,韦静,李晓非,谷东元.业务外包委托代理模型中的风险补偿安排[J].中国管理科学,2008,16(5):164-170. 被引量:7
  • 8Kim,S. H. , Cohen, M.A. , Netessine,S.. Performance Contracting in after-sales service supply chains[J]. Management Science, 2007, 53(12): 1843--1858.
  • 9Michael, J. C.. Incentive contracting for national defense: A problem of optimal risk sharing[J]. The Bell Journal of Economics, 1977, 8(1) :168--185.
  • 10Baron,D. P.. Defense procurement.. Politics, management, and incentives[C]. In: J. Leitzel and J. Tirole, eds. , Incentives in procurement contracting, Westview Press, 1993:22--23.

二级参考文献46

共引文献46

同被引文献56

引证文献10

二级引证文献18

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部