摘要
从武器装备采办的理论需求出发,以博弈论为理论工具,对武器装备采办过程中的生产成本控制问题进行了分析;建立了基于激励的生产成本控制模型,并对成本控制模型的特点进行了分析和解释;针对军方在激励合同执行过程中有可能出现的2类错误,对成本控制模型进行了优化。在非对称信息条件下,优化后的成本控制模型不但能有效减少2类错误的发生,而且可提高军方装备采办效用,减少代理方合同风险。
The problem of cost control in equipment acquisition is analyzed on the basis of weapon acquisition requirements and fundamental principles of game theory.The cost control model is established based on incentive theory.Then,characteristics of the model are analyzed.Next,the cost control model is optimized in order to reduce the chances of the two errors in the process of incentive contract for the army.It is proved that under unsymmetrical information condition,the optimized cost control model can effectively reduce the possibility of the two errors,and improve the efficiency of weapon acquisition and decrease the contract risk of agent as well.
出处
《装甲兵工程学院学报》
2009年第6期16-19,共4页
Journal of Academy of Armored Force Engineering
关键词
装备采办
成本控制
博弈论
模型
equipment acquisition
cost control
game theory
model