摘要
以我国股市开始以来到2005年底的1332家所有IPO新股为研究样本,分四个阶段对机构利益与IPO的抑价关系进行考察。研究发现:交易量放大的"佣金理论"在中国股票市场得到完全体现,承销商通过IPO发行中的法人配售机制输送利益给相关的利益共同体的现象是存在的,同时还存在承销商通过IPO抑价为其发行人创造未来再融资的条件和便利的现象;但保荐人制度下IPO抑价并不高,说明避免法律责任理论在中国股市尚不成立。
By using all the 1332 IPOs from the start of China＇ s stock market to the end of 2005 as research samples, this paper examines the relationship between institutional interests and IPO underpricing in four phases. The results show that the commission theory about the underwriters＇ incentive to increase trading volume do exist in China＇ s stock market. There also exists such phenomena that underwriters convey interests to the associated interest-sharing group members via issuing allocation function in IPO, and that the underwriters facilitate future refinancing for issuers via IPO underpricing. But, under the sponsor system, the ratio of Chinese IPO un- derpricing is not large, which indicates that lawsuit-avoidance has not yet emerged in China＇ s stock market.
出处
《广东商学院学报》
北大核心
2009年第6期72-76,共5页
Journal of Guangdong University of Business Studies
基金
广东省社会科学基金项目(06E16)
关键词
IPO抑价
法人配售
机构利益
发行
IPO underpricing
issuing allocation
institutional interests
issuing
