最终控制权、现金流权与上市公司过度投资

Ultimate Control Rights,Cash Flow Rights and Over-investment of China's Listed Companies

以最终控制权大于10%的215家上市公司为样本,对最终控制权、现金流权与过度投资的关系进行了实证分析。结果表明:现金流权、最终控制权均对过度投资有抑制作用;最终控制权与现金流权分离时,最终控制人倾向于过度投资以实现隧道效应,因此,降低上市公司最终控制权、现金流权分离程度可以提高投资效率。

With a sample of 215 listed companies whose proportion of ultimate control rights is more than 10% , this paper analyzes the relationship between ultimate control fights, cash flow rights and over-investment behavior. Results show that cash flow rights restrains the over-investment behavior, which verifies the incentive effect of cash flow fights. Ultimate control fights have restriction on over - investment, perhaps because balance structure ownership and external supervision. Otherwise, when ultimate control rights separate from cash flow rights, ultimate owner will be apt to carry out over - investment behavior and tunneling behavior.