股权激励、信息操纵与内部监控博弈分析

Game analysis on equity incentive,information manipulation and internal control

考虑到股权激励是一把"双刃剑",既激励经理努力工作,又激发经理进行信息操纵,本文建立了一个包括信息操纵与内部监控的股权激励合同模型.模型解的分析结果证明:上市公司股权激励的实施效果与资本市场的有效程度密切相关;资本市场的有效性越弱,经理信息操纵的程度越大,应该给予经理更少的股权份额;资本市场的有效性越弱或股权激励的强度越大,股东就越应该加强内部监控并加大惩罚力度;增强资本市场的有效性及加强内部监控能够有效地降低经理信息操纵的程度.

Considering that equity incentive is a ＂two-edge sword＂ ： It can not only inspirit a manager to work hard, but also motivate the manager to manipulate information, this paper constructs an equity incentive contract model including information manipulation and internal control. The analysis results of the model＇ s solution demonstrate that firstly, the effect of equity incentive is connected with the efficiency of stock market. Secondly, the less the efficiency of the stock market is and the higher the manager＇s information manipulation degree is, then shareholders should give smaller stock ratio to the manager. Thirdly, if the stock market is less efficiency and the more stocks are given to the manager, the shareholders should strengthen the internal control and punish the manager more heavily. Lastly, if the regulator institution supervises the stock markets more often to improve the efficiency of security markets and the shareholders intensify internal control, the degree of information manipulation can be reduced significantly.