一类零售商驱动型供应链契约问题

Contract problem of the supply chain driven by retailer

研究了不同信息结构下零售商驱动型供应链契约问题.对于由1个供应商和1个零售商构成的供应链,考察了线性契约以及2部线性契约.在完全信息及非对称信息两种条件下分别给出了供应商和零售商的最优契约,就批发价格、零售价格及利润进行了比较,并对由供应商、零售商驱动的两种供应链中信息的价值进行了对比研究.理论分析以及数值算例表明,供应商选择2部线性契约优于线性契约,对于完全信息条件,2部线性契约下零售商的期望利润大于线性契约下的期望利润.本文的研究结论对于零售商驱动型供应链的契约设计以及协调问题具有重要意义.

This paper studies the retailer-driven supply chain contracts under different information structure. For a supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer, it investigates the linear contract and two-part linear contract and gives the optimal contracts for the supplier and the retailer under complete information and asymmetric information, respectively. Furthermore, this paper makes a comparison of the wholesale prices, retail prices and profits two cases and compares the values of information for retailer-driven supply chain and supplier-driven supply chain. Theoretical analysis and numerical examples show that the two-part linear contract has an advantage over the linear contract for the supplier. The expected profit of the retailer with complete information under the two-part linear contract is greater than that under the linear contract. These conclusions are significant to design the contract and coordinate the retailer-driven supply chain effectively.