摘要
约翰.塞尔的生物自然主义将心灵状态归结为大脑的生物状态,在某种程度上可以解释心身互动,但依然无法解释和心身问题有着密切联系的自由意志问题。自由意志的存在预设了心灵状态或意识的某种相对独立的存在,否认这种相对的独立性正是塞尔难以解释自由意志的结症之所在。为了避免塞尔的问题,我们只能承认心灵状态存在的相对独立性以及心对身的非决定论性质的因果作用,即接受某种新显主义的心灵主义。
John Searle s biological naturalism claims that mental states are biological states of the brain and it can solve the problem of interaction between the mind and the body to some extent but it cannot handle the problem of free will.The existence of free will presupposes some relative existence of the mind or consciousness.It is because of his denial of this relative existence that Searle cannot explain the phenomena of free will.To avoid his problem,we have to accept the relative existence of mental states and non--deterministic mental causal power, namely,accept some kind of emergentist mentalism.
出处
《自然辩证法研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第12期1-6,共6页
Studies in Dialectics of Nature
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(09BZX053)
教育部人文社会科学研究规划项目(08JA720016)
