大股东-管理者合谋与监督效率——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

本文利用中国上市公司2003～2005年的面板数据对这一问题进行了检验。实证研究发现:上市公司管理者的机会主义行为与大股东的资金侵占行为显著相关,大股东对上市公司的资金侵占程度越高,上市公司管理者的机会主义行为越严重。这表明大股东与管理者的合谋行为会弱化大股东对公司管理者的监督效率。

This paper studies the issue by utilizing the data of listed companies in China from 2003 to 2005. Study shows that the opportunism conducts of managers of listed company are closely correlated with major shareholders occupation on the fund of listed company; the higher extent that major shareholders occupy listed company＇s funds,the severer opportunism conducts managers have,which means that collusion between major shareholders and managers will weaken major shareholders＇supervision efficiency over company managers.