国有企业管理者激励补偿效应——政府的角色

The Incentive Effect of State Owned Enterprise Manager——The Role of the Government

本文突出制度环境,研究了政府干预对国有企业管理者薪酬激励效应的影响。同时,比较了政府这一制度约束与管理者权力这一契约安排之间的制衡关系。通过实证分析发现,政府干预程度越低,管理者盈余管理的空间越有限,薪酬与企业真实绩效的敏感度越强,但这一现象只存在于管理者权力较小的企业。在管理者权力较大的企业,薪酬自定现象明显,政府干预的减少并未弱化管理者的权力,也没有提高薪酬激励效应。本文的结论进一步验证了制度环境对管理者激励契约的重要影响,并对现有相关文献加以扩展,指出了契约安排内的权力取向会削弱制度环境的影响。

This paper emphasizes the institutional environment, studies the government influence on the incentive effect of SOE managers, and compares the institutional factor-government with the contract factor-managerial power. Our empirical results indicate the more relax government intervenes, the less earnings management happens, the closer manager compensation relates with firm performance. But this result holds true only in the firms with weak managerial power. In the firms with strong managerial power,compensation is arranged by managers themselves,the decrease of government intervention can neither weaken managerial power, nor increase the incentive effect. These results not only prove the essential influence of institutional environment on compensation contract, but also expend the existing literatures for finding that managerial power can weaken the influence of institutional environment.