摘要
本文实证检验独立审计能否对大股东资金占用起到抑制作用。鉴于大股东资金占用与审计师选择之间的相互影响,本文采用联系方程模型对内生性予以控制。本文研究发现,高质量审计能够显著抑制上市公司大股东资金占用。但是,大股东资金占用越严重的公司,并不一定会选择高质量审计,表明中国资本市场目前尚缺乏对高质量审计的需求。
Based on the mannual data in Chinese A-share stock market and corporate governance index ( CGI), the paper examines whether auditing can restrain the controlling shareholders' cash embezzlement(CSCE) as an external governance mechanism of firms. Due to the interaction between CSCE and auditor choice, this paper adopts simultaneous equations to control the endogeneity. Results confirm that high quality auditors can significantly restrain the controlling shareholders' cash embezzlement. However, the listed firms in which the cash is embezzled by the controlling shareholders more severely do not tend to choose high quality auditors,which shows that there is a lack of high quality auditing demand at present in Chinese stock market.
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第1期111-117,共7页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基金
国家社会科学基金"会计准则
会计信息质量与会计信息的契约有用性研究"(07CJY010)
关键词
大股东资金占用
掏空
外部审计
公司治理
controlling shareholders' cash embezzlement
tunneling
external auditing
corporate governance